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DIAGNOSTIC ADJUDICATION IN
APPELLATE COURTS: THE SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA AND THE
CHARTER OF RIGHTS
By CARL BAAR* AND ELLEN BAAR**
Three distinct adjudicatory processes are found in appellate courts: decisional
adjudication (applying principles), procedural adjudication (choosing among
principles), and diagnostic adjudication (defining and developing principles). The
Supreme Court of Canada has traditionally used procedural adjudication, in which
the adversary process frames issues and generates supporting material. However,
the Court's decreased caseload, its increased discretion to select cases, and the
arrival of a new wave of issues under the Charter of Rights has shifted the Court's
work to diagnostic adjudication. As judgment becomes less a choice problem and
more a creative exercise, both the degree and kind of judicial involvement changes.
Thusfar, however, the Court's administrative responses to the pressure of its work
have had limited success. To be effective, reforms in the way the Court organizes
and processes its work must derive from an analysis of the requirements of
diagnostic adjudication. The paper concludes by suggesting an overall approach and
making specific proposals.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has
transformed the role of the country's judiciary. Since the
constitutional entrenchment of a wide variety of legal, political, and
egalitarian civil liberties in April 1982, Canadian courts have litigated
Copyright, 1989, Carl and Ellen Barr. Helpful comments on an earlier draft were
made by Professors Peter Russell and Alan Tarr, and Judges Francis Kovacs and Patricia
Wald.
Faculty of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School.
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thousands of Charter claims,1 and important new law has been made
in a wide variety of fields. Unresolved issues have come in
increasing number before the Supreme Court of Canada and the
court has shown its leadership by setting aside old precedents and
carving out new ones. At the same time, however, the Supreme
Court has found it increasingly difficult to do its work. Backlog and
delay have increased while dispositions have decreased.
This paper will argue that the new role of the Supreme
Court of Canada has transformed the nature of the adjudicatory
process that dominates the Court. The shift in emphasis from its
review function to its law development function has been
accompanied by a shift from procedural adjudication to diagnostic
adjudication. These shifts have created severe pressures on the
Court, and led to efforts to enhance its capacity. Thus far, however,
administrative efforts have been too narrowly conceived; they have
focused on freeing up more of the judges' time rather than focusing
on how the Court's organization and processes can be designed to
meet the demands of diagnostic adjudication. American reforms in
appellate court administration, usually designed for coping with high-
volume appellate review, may deflect our thinking away from the
challenge of increasing the quality of law development in a court of
last resort.
II. THREE TYPES OF ADJUDICATION
The concepts on which this paper is based derive from an
analysis of trial courts in the United States. That analysis emerged
from comparative field research directed by Thomas A. Henderson,
2
and is most fully explicated in an article in Judicature under the
I For quantitative data on reported cases, see F.L. Morton, "Charting the Charter - Year
One: A Statistical Analysis" (1984-85) 2 Can. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 239; and P.J. Monahan, "A
Critics' Guide to the Charter" in R.J. Sharpe, ed., ChJartcr Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths,
1987) at 383.
2 See T.A. Henderson et aL, The Significance of Judicial Structure: Vie Effect of
Unification on Trial Court Operations (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1984)
c. 5.
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principal authorship of Cornelius M. Kerwin. 3 The analysis applies
organization theory to court operations. The theory of organizations
is not limited to how organizations are managed. It also looks at
how they are designed, and how they perform their essential
functions - that is, how they process the work that makes up their
day-to-day tasks. These essential work processes have been termed
the organization's core technology. The core technology of a court,
for example, would be its adjudicatory process. 4 Henderson found
that the trial courts he researched were characterized by three
distinct adjudicatory processes: decisional adjudication, procedural
adjudication, and diagnostic adjudication.
An appellate court uses all three adjudicatory processes.
Decisional adjudication occurs when an appellate court applies
principles. Procedural adjudication takes place when an appellate
court chooses among principles. Diagnostic adjudication takes place
when an appellate court defines, develops, or designs principles.
Given the increased diversity of appellate courts, especially the
distinction between intermediate courts of appeal and courts of last
resort, certain tasks - and hence certain adjudicatory processes -
tend to be more important in some appellate courts than in others.
Within a given court, the relative importance of certain tasks and
hence the mix of adjudicatory processes vary over time.
Decisional adjudication occurs in those appeals where rules
are well established and can be applied in a more mechanical
fashion. Thus decisional adjudication would be more common in a
court that handles appeals as of right, where the error-correction or
appellate review function takes up a larger proportion of court
business than the law development function. Provincial courts of
appeal, for example, frequently dismiss an appeal without calling
upon the respondent; the panel members confer briefly after the
3 C.M. Kerwin, T. Henderson and C. Baar, "Adjudicatory Processes and the Organization
of Trial Courts" (1986-1987) 70 Judicature 99.
4 A Court has other components: its management structure (the registry, with its files
and schedules and statistical reports) and its institutional aspect (bench and bar committees,
opening of court ceremonies), but these function to service and buffer the court's core
technology (its adjudicatory process). See T.A. Henderson, R. Guynes, and C. Baar,
"Organizational Design for Courts' in J.A. Cramer, ed., Courts and Judges (Beverly Hills:
Sage Publications, 1981) at 19.
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appellant's argument, and conclude that a case has not been made
out. Since the courts do not have to choose among competing
principles, they can apply an existing rule.
Decisional adjudication emphasizes the expeditious dispatch
of appeals. Timeliness is particularly important in the numerous
sentence appeals that constitute a substantial part of the work of
provincial courts of appeal. Arguments emphasize the applicability
of established decision rules used by the Court. More elaborate
citation of precedent or attempts to distinguish precedent would
require more preparation time for counsel and could leave the Court
in the unenviable but not unknown position of ordering a sentence
reduced after the accused had served it.
Decisional adjudication would presumably be extremely rare
in courts of last resort where the review or error correction function
tends to give way to the law development function. Furthermore,
courts of last resort in more populous jurisdictions tend not to
handle the first appeal - the appeal as of right - and usually are in
a position to exercise discretion over which cases they choose to
review.5 However, while the judgments of courts of last resort are
unlikely to reflect a decisional adjudicatory process, one important
part of those courts' work does use decisional adjudication: the
process of deciding whether to exercise discretionary jurisdiction.
When the Supreme Court of Canada hears applications for leave
to appeal, arguments are brief. Decisions are either made from the
bench or without giving reasons. They most commonly reflect the
use of a mental check list: is there an important question of law?
was there a split decision in the court below? The role of the
lawyer who argues a leave petition changes from the production of
elaborate argument to the use of compelling assertion. The very
fact that applications for leave need not be argued in open court
indicates that decisions to grant or refuse leave are assumed to be
rule-application tasks appropriate for decisional adjudication.
5 Thus the Supreme Court of Canada, the Supreme Court of the United States, the High
Court of Australia, and three-fourths of American state supreme courts generally receive
appeals from appeals; the courts of appeal in Canadian provinces and Australian states, along
with the New Zealand Court of Appeal and the courts of last resort in one-fourth of the
American states, would draw a large proportion of their caseload from first appeals.
[VOL. 27 NO, 1
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Procedural adjudication centres on choosing among
competing principles. Which rule should govern and which should
be distinguished? In procedural adjudication, the choice is
sufficiently difficult or deemed to be sufficiently important that cases
are fully argued and documented before the court makes its decision.
Contending lawyers thus play the dominant role, reflecting the
expectation that the adversary system is most suitable for spelling out
and supporting alternatives from which a panel of judges is asked to
choose. The court assumes that it cannot decide the case simply by
applying a known rule; thus the need for fully developed adversary
proceedings. The court also assumes that it can decide the case
simply by choosing between adversaries; therefore, procedural
adjudication does not require extensive staff research support or long
deliberation before judgment is reached. Courts usually use
procedural adjudication in carrying out their appellate review (error
correction) function. They can engage in procedural adjudication in
carrying out their law development function when that function is
performed incrementally - by the gradual accretion of new
precedents.
Procedural adjudication appears to be the dominant
technology in English appellate courts, in part because an English
court faces a narrower "range of available case authorities" than
Canadian or American courts. As a result,
English judges can be confident that counsel in a case compelling a depth of
research into precedents will have at their convenient command those upon which
the courts are accustomed to base their judgments, and that no pertinent recent
case will be overlooked.
6
Following from this confidence, an English court is likely to choose
between existing precedents immediately after the completion of
oral argument. A recent description of practices in the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council (which hears appeals from those
Commonwealth jurisdictions that still retain it as a court of last
resort) provides a glimpse of procedural adjudication at work:
In the Privy Council, although judgment is more often than not reserved, the actual
decision is arrived at very soon after the argument ends, in that the Counsel retire
6 B.M. Dickens, "A Canadian Development: Non-Party Intervention" (1977) 40 Mod. L.
Rev. 666 at 674.
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from the Chamber [and t]hen in turn each of the members of the Board, commonly
a Board of five, gives his opinion, starting with the junior, the numbers are added
up and that is the decision except in the very rarest of cases. Somebody is fastened
on then to write the judgment, and the writing may take some time..., but basically
in the overwhelmingly majority of cases the decision is taken I suppose within three-
quarters of an hour or so of the actual conclusion of the argument. The argument
may have taken some days, often it does, so one has had plenty of opportunity to
reflect during the course of the case. At the end, immediately the argument is
finished one is expected to give one's opinion, not with the formality of an oral
judgment but with reasons, so that whoever is ultimately given the task of actually
writing the judgment can collate the various views.
7
Canadian appellate courts typically spend less time hearing
oral argument, and require more extensive documentation than their
English, Australian, or New Zealand counterparts. But they still
essentially rely on the adversary process to spell out alternative
arguments from which a choice can be made. Historically, the
Supreme Court of Canada often used seiiatim opinions; each justice
worked independently composing reasons for judgment and regular
conferences were not held. Since judgment fundamentally involved
a choice problem rather than a creative exercise, judges could work
in relative isolation, and collegial interaction was not essential to
solve an intellectual problem at the root of an appeal. In addition,
the court's legal research capacity did not require enhancement by
law clerks. While there "certainly ... were exchanges of draft
judgments and of opinion thereon, some of these exchanges occurred
surprisingly close - sometimes less than a week - to the actual
handing-down of the judgment."8  Thus the Supreme Court of
Canada worked on its own variant of procedural adjudication; since
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was, prior to 1949, the
final court of appeal for Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada
apparently did not see a need to synthesize individual views in a
single set of reasons for the Court.
While appellate judges are more active in the course of court
proceedings than their trial counterparts and less likely to feel
7"Court of Appeal President: An Interview with Rt. Hon. Sir Robin Cooke" (1986) New
Zealand Li. 170 at 179 [hereinafter Cooke hIterview]. Cooke sat on the Privy Council on a
number of occasions.
8 J.G. Snell and F. Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada: Histoty of ie hIstitution
(Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1985) at 164. See also 162, 224, and 240. Regular conferences
were not established until 1967.
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compelled to take on the referee's stance that a jury trial demands,
they remain more reactive than proactive. The issues on which they
rest their decisions are based largely on the parties' factums. Even
the unprecedented arguments of Duff C.J. and Cannon J. in the
1938 Alberta Press Bill Reference that a right of free public discussion
is contained by implication in the Preamble of the British North
America Act can be traced to the factum of the federal government's
lawyer.
9
Furthermore, appellate judges engaged in procedural
adjudication are expected to maintain their objectivity when listening
to oral argument, using questions as a form of devil's advocacy to
inform their choice among principles. This expectation of objectivity
is one of the reasons some appellate judges to this day feel it is
inappropriate to read an appellant's brief or factum prior to hearing
the oral argument. On the United States Supreme Court, the late
Justice Felix Frankfurter would reach his decision on the basis of
oral argument, and only afterward consult the briefs for support;
Justice Hugo Black would always read the briefs before oral
argument and often would be the first to pepper counsel with
questions. Some appellate courts in Australia and New Zealand
have only recently asked for any supporting documentation from
counsel. The current President of the New Zealand Court of
Appeal recalled when as a practitioner he would write out "in
longhand ... a very brief sketch or summary of the sort of things I
was going to say, and I would occasionally hand this into the
Court."10 The current consensus in common law countries seems to
be that while appellate judges in procedural adjudication should
retain an open mind on a case prior to oral argument, their
objectivity is not compromised if the court operates a "hot bench"
rather than a "cold bench.""1
9 Reference re Alberta Statutes, [1938] S.C.R. 100, [1938] D.L.R. 81. Discussion of the
arguments may be found in C. Baar, "Using Process Theory to Explain Judicial Decision-
Making" (1986) 1 Can. J. of Law & Soc. 57.
10 Cooke Interview, supra, note 7 at 172. Counsel before the Full Court of the Supreme
Court of Victoria (Melbourne, Australia) may even today submit only the briefest sketch of
their arguments.
11 These terms are used by P.M. Saeta, 'Tentative Opinions: Letting a Little Sunshine
into Appellate Decision Making" (1981) 20(3) The Judges' Journal 20 at 50.
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Diagnostic adjudication moves a step beyond procedural
adjudication in the complexity of its task. Diagnostic adjudication in
appellate courts must define a principle for a case in which a choice
between existing principles is not sufficient. It is used primarily in
an appellate court's law development function, particularly when
that function is conducted on a comprehensive rather than an
incremental basis. Courts must give greater emphasis to crafting
reasons for judgment, as those reasons may have implications for a
wider area of the law and a wider range of litigants. Thus,
diagnostic adjudication requires wider search, often beyond existing
precedents to larger governing principles.1 2  Collegiality becomes
increasingly important, because panel members must not simply
choose between contending interpretations and precedents, but must
debate among themselves the underlying issues and the consequences
of alternative solutions. Joint deliberation and exchange of ideas
extend the oral argument of adversaries in the courtroom.
Diagnostic adjudication requires a broader range and a
greater depth of information, because it occurs when principles are
sufficiently unclear that contending counsel cannot be expected to
frame the choice adequately. Thus courts using diagnostic
adjudication are more likely to develop a pattern of allowing non-
party intervention, as in the use of amicits ctitae briefs in the
United States and intervenors during oral argument in Canada, so
that a wider range of legal issues has been canvassed prior to
judgment. Preparation of full briefs and factums, and their review
by members of the panel prior to oral argument, becomes the norm.
Both more judge time (individually and collectively) and more staff
time (particularly of law clerks) are devoted to preparing reasons
and reaching judgment.
Diagnostic adjudication differs from the other two
adjudicatory processes in its potential impact on the body of the law.
The legal impact of decisional adjudication is minimal. Courts use
it when a decision is either not governed by precedent and therefore
the decision ( for example, a grantor refuses leave to appeal) is not
12 A relevant analogy is the generic hearing used in some regulatory proceedings. See
L. Vandervorst, Political Control of IndependentAdninistrativeAgencies (Ottawa: Law Reform
Commission of Canada, 1979) at 15-22, 46-52; and D. Fox, Public Participation in the
Atninistrative Process (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1979) at 9-55.
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binding in the future,13 or governed so closely by an existing rule
that the decision to dismiss the appeal will not alter the existing
body of law. The potential impact of procedural adjudication is
greater, but still confined to elaboration of criteria by which a given
set of facts may be included or excluded from the coverage of
contending legal principles. The potential impact of diagnostic
adjudication is greatest, because by developing a principle that
applies to the case, a court changes the relationship among legal
principles; it alters the ordering of the principles rather than merely
the location of the boundaries between them.
In practice, an appellate court could still treat a case
requiring the definition or development of a principle as if it were
a problem requiring the choice among contending principles. But
courts would be engaging in elaboration of distinctions too precious
to support a coherent jurisprudence, and they would not be
responsive to novel fact situations.
III. DIAGNOSTIC ADJUDICATION AND DELAY IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
The Supreme Court of Canada is becoming increasingly
involved in tasks requiring diagnostic adjudication. As the mandatory
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court declines to the point where its
caseload comes largely from petitions for leave to appeal, the cases
that come before the Court are more likely to be those in which the
principles at issue are the least clearly defined. As fewer cases are
dealt with in certain areas of law, pressure builds to move beyond
the issues put forward by the parties in those cases. "[I]f we are
13 The refusal to grant leave to appeal may still be very significant (for example, in
allowing a lower court decision to stand or declining to resolve an issue on which there is an
interprovincial difference in interpretation), but the absence of binding reasons means the
Court can use a technology that reduces the need to deliberate and emphasizes expeditious
(even intuitive) application of decision rules. Procedures could also be developed to ensure
that decisional adjudication is properly conducted, especially as an increasing proportion of
leave applications are denied. Denials of leave are becoming sufficiently newsworthy that The
[Toronto] Globe and Mail reported two of them on 21 May 1986: 'Top Court Agrees Public
not Entitled to See Land Offers" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (21 May 1986) A5; "Sex
Sentence Will Stand, Supreme Court tell Inuk" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (21 May 1986)
A10.
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only going to bring up one or two tort cases or one or two property
cases in a year," argues a member of the Court, "then we should
make the most of the opportunity by adopting a more expansive
approach to our decision-making role."
14
The Charter of Rights & Freedons has accentuated the trend
toward diagnostic adjudication. The Supreme Court of Canada has
treated most Charter cases as exercises in defining and developing
new principles. Even when the narrow issue in a case seems to be
clear to the Court, the impact of its decision is not. Will a
particular decision rejecting a Charter claim adequately reflect the
constitutional status of the rights it contains? Will the acceptance
of a Charter claim create expectations about future cases that the
Court is hesitant or unwilling to convey? Charter cases have taken
the Court beyond the procedural adjudication that it historically
adopted for its work. There are two reasons for the shift: first, the
nature of Charter adjudication calls for interpretation of broad
constitutional statements and wider assessment of the consequences
of the interpretation selected; and second, the number of non-
Charter cases accepted for hearing has been reduced.
Before the Chater was enacted on 17 April 1982, the
Supreme Court of Canada had averaged a half dozen constitutional
decisions per year since 1975,1 and three or four per year during
the 1949-74 period following abolition of appeals to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council.1 6  While the balance of its work
traditionally covered all areas of the law, public law (principally
criminal and administrative law) has gradually squeezed out private
law on the Court's docket.1 7  Since 1982, Chatter cases have
emerged as one of the major areas of litigation. Within twenty-four
14 Quoting from the David B. Goodman Memorial Lectures delivered by Madame Justice
Bertha Wilson at the University of Toronto, 26-27 November 1985, lecture one at 16
[hereinafter Goodman Lectures].
15 P.H. Russell, 'The Supreme Court and Federal-Provincial Relations: The Political
Use of Legal Resources" 11 Can. Pub. Pol. 161 at 161-62.
16 C. Baar, "Judicial Behavior and Comparative Rights Policy" in R.P. Claude, ed.,
Comparative Human Rights (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) 353 at 361-62.
17 See the symposium on "The Future of the Supreme Court of Canada as the Final
Appellate Tribunal in Private Law Litigation" (1983) 7 Can. Bus. LJ. 389.
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months of the Charter's enactment, over twenty cases raising Charter
arguments had been accepted for appeal.
Therefore, diagnostic adjudication is likely to become the
Court's dominant technology. As this new adjudicatory process
emerges, strains are already evident as the Court attempts to cope
with a workload that requires a different degree and kind of
involvement on the part of the individual justices. Thus, for
example, the total number of written judgments has declined, and is
now well below the average of ninety new cases granted leave to
appeal each year.
Table 1
Total Number of Written Judgments,
Supreme Court of Canada, 1976-85












Source: Supreme Court Reports
The Court's output from 1983-85 is running consistently
behind cases coming on for argument. Table One confirms that the
Court's work has been subject to increasingly serious delays. The
elapsed time from completion of oral argument to issuance of
judgment has almost doubled, from a mean time of 4.55 months in
1976 to 8.7 months in 1985. During that period, the number of
completed judgments reserved for over twelve months has gone from
zero to 23. Charter cases illustrate the trend and are quite likely to
1989]
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be one of the major factors exacerbating it. Thus while over 20
cases raising Charter issues were before the Court by the summer of
1984, only 16 such cases had been decided by the summer of 1986.
Table 2
Elapsed Time from Oral Argument to
































































Source: Supreme Court Reports
The poor condition of the Court's caseload suggests real
limits on the Court's capacity to conduct diagnostic adjudication in
an expeditious manner. At the same time, the quality of the Court's
current work on the Charter is high enough to suggest that it has
devoted considerable time and effort to its new principle-defining
task. For example, the sixteen initial cases have shown a surprising
degree of consensus. Dissents have been infrequent and even
concurrences relatively less common than in past constitutional cases.
At the same time, many of the Court's Charter judgments have
broken new legal ground. In four cases, well-established precedents
have been superceded by the Court's interpretation of Charter
[VOL. 27 NO. 1
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language.18 In all, judgments have favoured the Charter claims in
eleven of the sixteen cases,1 9 and in two other cases in which
government action was upheld, Charter claimants could find partial
support for their position in the Court's reasons.
20
The Court's decisions have not only broken new ground, but
in keeping with the use of diagnostic adjudication, the Court has
supported its judgments with original reasoning rather than applying
the established principles enunciated by the United States Supreme
Court in analogous cases. This approach was exemplified in the
case of Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, in which a national
antiwar coalition brought suit to prevent testing of the American
cruise missile in Canada on the ground that it would increase the
likelihood of war and would therefore threaten the lives of
Canadians in a manner violating the guarantees of fundamental
justice in section 7 of the Charter. Critics of the Charter saw the
suit as an example of how established powers of cabinet and
parliament could be subject to review of the courts; judges and
lawyers saw it as involving the courts in political issues. Those
familiar with the long line of American cases which precluded
judicial review of foreign and military policy quickly began invoking
the political question doctrine (while remaining ignorant of the 1952
Steel Seizure case).21 There could have been little doubt that the
18 Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 17 D.L.R. (4th)
422; The Queen v. Big M, Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321; The Queen
v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 655; Dubois v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
350, 23 D.L.R. (4th) 503.
19 The four in footnote 18 above plus two companion cases to Therens and the following
5 cases: Attoney General of Quebec v. Qudbec Association of Protestant School Boards, [1984]
2 S.C.R. 66, 10 D.L.R. (4th) 321; Lawson Hunter v. Southamn, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 11 D.L.R.
(4th) 641; Reference re Section 94(2) of the British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
486, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536; Thre Queen v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 206;
Clarkson v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 493.
20 Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481; and
Valent v. Thre Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 161. The Charter claim was also
rejected in Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, 9 D.L.R. (4th) 161.
In two cases the Charter claim was not reached: Krug v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 255, 21
D.L.R. (4th) 161; and Jack and Charlie v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 332, 21 D.L.R. (4th)
641.
21 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 72 S. Ct. 863 (1952).
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Supreme Court of Canada would uphold the authority of the federal
government to allow testing of the cruise missile. Yet the Court's
reasons accomplished two other results: (1) Cabinet decisions were
held to be subject to judicial review under the Chare, an
unprecedented assertion of judicial power in Canada, and (2) the
political question doctrine - whose difficulties were pointed out to
the Court - was carefully avoided in relatively terse reasons by Chief
Justice Brian Dickson, speaking for the majority. Dickson based the
Court's logic on the hypothetical nature of the link between the
proposed tests and the harm (deprivation of life) proscribed by the
Charter The Supreme Court outcome contrasted with that of the
Federal Court of Appeal, in which all five members of the panel
wrote their own opinions.22 The collegial deliberation associated
with diagnostic adjudication had replaced the procedural adjudication
reflected in the use of seiatim opinions.
A similar process and result characterized the case of The
Queen v. Oakes, in which a reverse onus provision of the federal
Narcotics Control Act was held to violate the Charter right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty. The provision had been
invalidated in all four cases brought to provincial courts of appeal.
The Ontario Court of Appeal, which decided Oakes, developed an
elaborate test derived from American precedents. The Supreme
Court's unanimous reasons avoided direct application of the
American case law, building instead on a proportionality test
enunciated in a Charter decision the year before. Thus in both
cases, the Court avoided choosing available though non-binding
principles to justify its decisions; instead it developed principles it
felt were appropriate, building on and refining the reasons of the
courts below.
The absence of public opposition to the principles enunciated
in individual Supreme Court decisions suggests that the time
consumed crafting shared reasons may have enhanced the legitimacy
of the Court's controversial new role. For example, a decision
22
The Queen v. Operation Dismantle, [1983] 1 F.C. 745, 3 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (F.C.A.D.).
One of the results of the Supreme Court's collegial process was evidently the brevity of its
reasons, since Justice Wilson produced an elaborate set of concurring reasons that did not
secure the votes of her colleagues, suggesting that consensus could emerge on a new principle
only if it was more narrowly circumscribed.
[VOL. 27 NO. 1
Diagnostic Adjudication
invalidating the federal Lord's Day Act23 has not seen a mounting of
attacks from religious groups. The requirement that drivers believed
to be impaired must be notified of their right to counsel before
being required to give a sample of their breath 24 has not been
attacked by law enforcement authorities, even though the
breathalyser evidence in that case was excluded under section 24(2)
of the Charter Similarly, elimination of the reverse onus provision
of the Narcotics Control Act produced no cries of concern from
politicians or law enforcement authorities. This is not to say that
the Court has been free from the informed criticism of scholars and
practitioners on both the left and right of the political spectrum.
25
However, on a variety of measures of the quality of its results, the
Supreme Court of Canada has scored well in its initial Charter
decisions: degree of consensus, willingness to innovate, care in
crafting reasons, and public acceptance/legitimacy.
The Court's current performance suggests that it has traded
away the expeditious processing of cases in an effort to increase the
quality of its judgments and reasons. Rather than reduce the time
that members of the Court spend on Charter judgments (and
presumably on other cases as well), the court has taken longer to
complete its decisions. Because this trade-off, however unplanned
it may have been, has facilitated diagnostic adjudication, it seems
preferable to sacrificing the effort to develop principles in order to
23 The Queen v. Big M Dnig Mart, supra, note 18.
24 The Queen v. Therens, supra, note 18.
25 Academics and practising lawyers remain sceptical of the Supreme Court's effectiveness
in playing the broader role required by the Charter. (See the remarks of S. Kujawa at the
1986 annual convention of the Canadian Bar Association, 'Top Court Judges Out of Their
Depth in Charter Decisions, Lawyer Says" T/he [Toronto] Globe and Mail (22 August, 1986)
Al). Critics on the left fear that the traditionally conservative Canadian judiciary will adapt
the Charter to serve commercial interests. Their fears have centred on the possibility that the
broad requirement of "fundamental justice" in section 7 will be used to import concepts of
substantive due process that were used in American courts before 1937 to overrule public
regulation of the economy. Thus the Supreme Court's most controversial Charter judgment
of its first sixteen was in the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 19; the Court,
invalidating an apparently minor section of a provincial highway traffic statute, concluded that
"fundamental justice" had a substantive as well as procedural meaning. While that decision
could easily be restricted in future cases, it could also be expanded; given the Court's broad
application of other Charter provisions to corporations (see the search and seizure case,
Hunter v. Southain, supra, note 19), expansion is quite possible.
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meet elapsed time standards. At the same time, however, the
consistent failure of the Court to produce decisions at the same rate
it agrees to hear cases cannot continue without still greater increases
in backlogs and delay, and the inevitable strains that accompany
those increases.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSES TO SUPREME COURT
DELAY
The Court, under the leadership of Chief Justice Dickson,
has proposed and implemented a number of organizational responses
to its failure to decide cases expeditiously. For example, Chief
Justice Dickson's first well-publicized administrative change was to
enable lawyers outside Ottawa to argue leave applications via
television. This change reduces the litigant's expenses, but focuses
not on the diagnostic activities of the Court but on its decisional
adjudication. The Chief Justice has publicly pleaded with the
practising bar to present more fully-developed and effective
arguments on Charter issues; he is thus using moral persuasion to
encourage improvements in the quality of procedural adjudication.
Neither reform addresses diagnostic adjudication. However, these
responses have been inadequate because they have not focused on
structural changes to improve the Court's ability to effectively use
diagnostic adjudication. In fact, the Court's responses have often
not been directed at diagnostic adjudication or have undermined the
process.
A number of administrative changes proposed by and for the
Court do focus on increasing the one commodity deemed essential
for diagnostic adjudication: judicial time. Thus, the Minister of
Justice, with support of the Supreme Court, introduced Bill C-105
in April 1986, which would allow the Court to rule on leave
petitions without hearing oral argument and would allow Court
judgments to be deposited with the Registrar rather than delivered
in open court. These reforms would save judge time currently
devoted to decisional adjudication or court formalities; the former
proposal would allow more involvement in screening by the justices'
personal law clerks.
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Another way to increase the time available for individual
cases is to reduce the number of cases accepted for review. This
has already been done, and the logic is made explicit by Madame
Justice Wilson:
Under the pressure of a heavy caseload the delicate balance which should exist
between judicial independence and collegiality may be displaced and collegiality may
give way to expediency. This is an extremely serious matter for an appellate tribunal
because the integrity of the process itself is threatened. The only answer, we
concluded, is to grant fewer leaves and make sure that the balance between the
Court's sitting time and its nonsitting time is appropriate and correct, one that
allows adequate time for research and reflection, for conferring with one's
colleagues, for the drafting and redrafting of reasons for judgment.2
6
Justice Wilson makes an articulate statement of certain conditions
which are necessary for diagnostic adjudication in a court of last
resort, but hearing fewer cases may be a self-defeating means to
achieve those conditions. As the Court further rations its time by
taking fewer cases, the need to develop more comprehensive
principles increases, procedural adjudication becomes even less
appropriate, and the Court in turn requires even more time per case
for the diagnostic adjudication necessary for the matters remaining
on its reduced docket.
One way out of this dilemma would be to specialize,
accepting cases only in particular areas of the law, in the hope that
a larger number of cases in specialized areas would allow more
incremental development of the law, and hence a return to the
viable use of procedural adjudication. Currently, specialization is
occurring on a de facto basis - for example, in certain areas of
public law - without substituting any other forum or process for
dealing with private law matters on a national level. No proposals
are pending for creating specialized national courts of last resort.
But if that effort is premised on the hope of retarding the current
shift to diagnostic adjudication, it may be unproductive because the
conditions that have undermined the utility of procedural
adjudication in the Supreme Court of Canada are largely external to
the Court (the proliferation of legislation, administrative decisions
and lower court judgments, the instability of previously-established
legal principles).
26 Goodman Lectures, supra, note 14, lecture one at 23.
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The Court still retains a small amount of non-discretionary
jurisdiction (for example, in criminal appeals when there is a
dissenting opinion in a provincial appeal court panel), and Bill C-
105 would convert these remaining areas to the Court's discretionary
jurisdiction. If enacted, this change would allow the Court to
decrease marginally the number of cases it hears each year without
decreasing the number of cases in which it defines and develops
principles. Yet this change will once again decrease the utility of
procedural adjudication and increase further the dominance of
diagnostic adjudication in the Supreme Court.
The most misconceived step to increase the time available
for the judges is the limitation of non-party intervenors in Charter
cases. A decade ago, the increased presence of non-party
intervenors in the Supreme Court of Canada was hailed as an
important shift away from English procedure,27 and a recognition of
the role intervenors could play in broadening the range of relevant
issues before the Court. Now, with the Charter demanding the
development of new legal principles, the Court has established a
pattern of denying applications by intervenors - even when those
intervenors had appeared in the court below and seen their
arguments incorporated in that court's reasons.28 If current delays
in the Supreme Court of Canada stem from efforts to develop
principles beyond the choice problem posed by the parties to an
appeal, the use of intervenors should increase the ability of the
Court to do so, by increasing the diversity of arguments presented
to the Court prior to judgment. To limit intervenors is to erode
one of the major supports for diagnostic adjudication developed by
the Supreme Court prior to the Charter and to do so at a time when
it is most needed. By creating the illusion that Charter litigation can
be conducted with procedural adjudication, the Court may be making
its own problem worse.
27 See B.M. Dickens, supra, note 6.
28 See J. Welch, "No Room at the Top: Interest Group Intervenors and Charter
Litigation in the Supreme Court of Canada" (1985) 43 U.T. Fac. L Rev. 204; and K.P. Swan,
"Intervention and Amicus Curiae Status in Charter Litigation" in R.J. Sharpe, ed., Charter
Litigation (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987) at 27.
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V. A NEW APPROACH TO DIAGNOSTIC ADJUDICATION
How can the Supreme Court of Canada approach its
administrative difficulties in a manner consistent with its emerging
adjudicative responsibilities? Research and reflection, conferring
with one's colleagues, drafting and redrafting of reasons for judgment
are some of the requirements for diagnostic adjudication in a court
of last resort. But it is wrong to assume that increasing the amount
of off-the-bench time per case is the way to meet these
requirements.29 Time is important: effective use of time, however,
is more important.
Increasing the number of courtrooms and judges is not the
best answer to trial court delay, because in too many cases, existing
courtrooms and judges are not used effectively. Thus trial court
delay reduction programs consistently emphasize improvements in
resource utilization - reducing downtime by increasing the certainty
that parties are ready for trial, using pretrial conferences to
encourage settlement when appropriate and to focus issues at trial
(reducing the length of trials that do proceed), and monitoring the
flow of cases through the court to allow rapid reallocation of
personnel. While these particular techniques focus on procedural
adjudication, the effective use of resources can also improve
diagnostic adjudication. Trial courts need to use their resources
more effectively or else they could grow inordinately large. Courts
of last resort need to use their resources more effectively or else
their caseloads will become so small that their essential unifying role
in the legal system will be compromised.
To use its time effectively, the Supreme Court of Canada
must use information effectively. The effective use of information
for legal development has two elements. First, the amplification of
information; the Court must have a sufficient breadth and depth of
information to do its job. Second, the attenuation of information;
29 A generation ago, similar issues were debated about the Supreme Court of the United
States following the publication of H.M. Hart's famous essay, 'Ihe Time Chart of the Justices"
(1959) 73 Harv. L. Rev. 84. See especially the acerbic response of legal realist T. Arnold,
"Professor Hart's Theology' (1960) 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1298, which suggests that giving U.S.
Supreme Court justices the time to reach a consensus would be the equivalent of a sentence
of life imprisonment.
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the Court must be able to organize the wide range of information
it receives so that it can focus on the most critical pieces of
information.30  Positive results can only be achieved if the court
possesses all relevant information and is able to sift through and
synthesize that information.
When a case first comes before the Court, it may be difficult
to know what information will become essential for the ultimate
decision and its reasoning. In most cases, a court of last resort has
some guidance from the intermediate appellate court; the court
below often sorts through a great number of grounds for appeal so
that the Supreme Court is steered towards certain major and/or
disputed issues. But the Court should hesitate to place limits on the
parties at the initial state of an appeal, lest the parties be asked to
direct themselves to a particular issue that, upon review of the
factums and appeal book and presentation of oral argument, may
not have been the best issue on which the appeal should turn. At
the initial stage, therefore, information should be amplified.
Amplification requires not only that counsel address in their
written submissions the full range of relevant questions in dispute,
but that intervenors be allowed to make written and oral submissions
as well, and not be restricted by the false economy of the Court's
recent practice. The Court will also need to be open to empirical
evidence necessary for the development of Charter principles. For
example, when Chief Justice Jules Deschenes of the Cour sup6rieure
du Qu6bec had to decide whether restrictions on minority language
educational rights under section 23 were reasonable limits under
section 1, he required the evidence of demographers to assess the
validity of the provincial government's justification.31  Madame
Justice Wilson also recommended amplifying information available to
the Court by "generous interpretation [of] the Court's rules
governing interventions" and "broaden[ing] the base of admissible
30 The framework used here is taken from the.work of S. Beer in the field of cybernetics
and information processing. See his 1973 CBC Massey Lectures, Designing Freedom (Toronto:
Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 1974).
31 Qudbec Association of Protestant School Boards v. A.G. Qudbec (1982), 140 D.L.R. (3d)
33, 3 C.R.R. 114 (Que. Sup. Ct.).
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evidence."3 2  She saw these recommendations as "fairly straight-
forward procedural accommodations that we can make to our new
role." She also argued that liberalized intervention "would assist in
legitimizing the Court's new role through a more open and accessible
court process."
Once information has been amplified, in order to define and
develop legal principles the court must then attenuate - the court
must organize, focus, sort out, and apply the information. To
guarantee that the Court makes effective use of its time, the
attenuation process should also be efficient; however, the techniques
used to achieve efficiency must reinforce rather than undermine the
conditions for diagnostic adjudication. One way this is possible is to
attenuate information at an early stage in the process. For example,
since members of the Court normally read written submissions in
advance of oral argument, attenuation has already begun, as panel
members focus on particular issues and then probe for more
information on those issues during oral argument. Perhaps this
process could be made more effective if all counsel were notified by
a brief memorandum prior to oral argument that members of the
Court would especially welcome attention to certain issues. This
prior notification should enhance the quality and relevance of oral
argument, making the time spent in Court more helpful for the
subsequent drafting and redrafting stage. It should reduce the
necessity for a rehearing, which occurred in one of the early Charter
cases.33  It should serve a function analogous to the pretrial
conferences that attempt to narrow issues so that trials are not
unnecessarily long and diffuse. Trial courts that have used pretrial
procedures to narrow and focus issues find that the resulting trials
are conducted more effectively. The same objective could be
achieved through the use of advance memoranda. To the extent
that the Court uses a technique such as this, oral argument could
not only be more focused, but also more brief.
3 4
32 Goodnan Lectures, supra, note 14, lecture two at 11-15.
33 Singh v. Minister of Employment and InUnigration, supra, note 18.
34 For a recent illustration of existing Supreme Court efforts to focus oral argument, see
. Batten, Judges (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1986) at 281.
1989]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
At least three United States Courts of Appeal use a similar
procedure. The District of Columbia Court of Appeal very often
sends a notice to counsel that "we want to hear" certain issues
addressed in oral argument.35 A similar practice is used in the Ninth
Circuit (based in San Francisco) 36 and by certain panels in the Fifth
Circuit (based in New Orleans).37 Thus the use of an advance
memorandum to focus oral argument is well established in high-
volume appellate courts that must also handle complex litigation
unlikely to be reviewed by a higher court.
38
Canadian lawyers and appellate judges would resist the strict
time limits on oral argument so common in the United States, and
justifiably so. If the presentations of counsel are excessively
attenuated, the Court may have inadequate information on which to
develop its decision. On the other hand, techniques that reduce the
length of oral argument without preventing counsel from making
relevant arguments should be welcome. Consider the comments by
the President of the New Zealand Court of Appeal:
I'm a firm believer in the value of oral argument. I can think of numbers of cases
in which a few careful and concise but forceful submissions from Counsel have
changed my thinking on the subject and sometimes altered the result of a case....
I hope we will never lose the benefit of ... it through people putting in a whole lot
of written material and then tending to read it to the Court. And what I would like
to see, without imposing time limits on Counsel, is some better system of putting
an argument, or more thought being given to concisepresentation.... The weight of
an argument is definitely not what it actually weighs.
3 9
Discussion by Chief Judge Patricia M. Wald, District of Columbia Court of Appeal,
in a panel at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C.,
August 30, 1986.
36 Reported by S.L. Wasby in discussion with one of the authors, based upon his
research in the Ninth Circuit.
37 In those panels in which Judge Alvin Rubin sits, as reported to one of the authors by
Donna Stienstra of the Federal Judicial Center.
38 A related practice, the issuance of tentative rulings on appeals in the Los Angeles
Superior Court, is described by Judge P.M. Saeta, supra, note 11. The system, originated by
Judge S.M. Hufstedler, has focused and shortened oral argument and has, according to Saeta,
"met with unqualified approval by the bench and bar," supra, note 11 at 20.
39 Cooke Interview, supra, note 7 at 173. "[S]omething will have to be done to restrain
it [the "tendency to be prolix"] unless addicts at the Bar reform voluntarily," added the Court
of Appeal President.
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And consider these comments by an American appellate judge in
1942, summarizing an American Bar Association committee study:
A mere oration about the case cannot aid the court very much in deciding it. Real
information about the facts and the issues is very helpful. Only the judges can
know the matters about which they are in doubt, and they do know this much
better if they have made a study of the case prior to the argument. If, by prior
study, they can think of and ask questions about matters which the attorneys might
not present, then the attorneys are given an opportunity to state their views on
propositions which the judges would otherwise decide solely from their own research
after the argument has ended.
40
In practice, advance memoranda could increase the quality as
well as reduce the length of oral argument, because counsel could
be more confident that panel members were familiar with the case.
Furthermore, advance memoranda would ensure a continued
effective role for counsel even as procedural adjudication gives way
to diagnostic adjudication. While some members of the Court might
see the production of advance memoranda as using even more of
their already scarce time resources, early attention to a case - as
with early attention to any task - can reduce time and effort spent
later on.
Diagnostic adjudication also creates new tasks and roles for
court staff. When a court defines and develops new principles, its
impact is potentially very wide. Therefore it needs to understand
the possible consequences of its decisions. The greater use of
intervenors and the more intensive use of oral argument are
designed to obtain a wider and more thoughtful range of forecasts
about those consequences. Once those forecasts have been
canvassed by the court, it needs to assess their validity - to attenuate
information about consequences. When the Supreme Court focuses
on legal consequences, the judges are usually able to assess the
forecasts of counsel. Law clerks are available to reinforce judicial
efforts, but this is a new role for these professional staff personnel.
Traditionally, the law clerk's role has been to amplify rather than
attenuate information, to dig for lines of precedents that their judges
believe have not been adequately canvassed. In effective diagnostic
adjudication, information from counsel will be amplified, requiring
the law clerk to contribute to the process of organizing information
40 L.M. Hyde, "Appellate Court Decisions" (1942) 28 A.B.AJ. 808-12.
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and assessing legal consequences. This expanded role should not
mean that the judges' intellectual work will shift to the staff; the
early involvement of the judges in the cases (through use of advance
memoranda) will allow them to define and structure the law clerk's
tasks more fully.
The Court's decisions will also have non-legal consequences,
and counsel are likely to present forecasts of those consequences as
well. These non-legal forecasts are particularly important in Charter
cases, since some of the most critical interpretations of the limits in
section 1 rest on those forecasts. For example, the current debate
on the constitutionality of mandatory retirement rests not so much
in the meaning of the section 15 equality rights guarantees, but on
whether the consequences of its abolition will be sufficiently serious
to justify retaining it as a reasonable limit on section 15 rights.
Should section 1 be invoked when counsel can make a plausible
argument regarding those consequences, or should available empirical
data be considered as well? It is likely that counsel in this and
other cases will submit non-legal, data-based forecasts of
consequences. It is also likely that contradictory data and conflicting
forecasts will be presented. How can the Court assess these? It
would be irresponsible simply to say that given the apparent conflict,
the data are inconclusive. No judge would say that when faced with
conflicting interpretations of a legal principle. If the justices lack
the expertise to assess forecasts, the Court will need to acquire it.
Given the wide range of non-legal forecasts likely to require
assessment by the Court in the course of Charter litigation, retaining
specialized staff experts is not feasible. A more effective model may
be the use of qualified experts in a temporary consultative capacity
(perhaps with the status of special masters), charged with collating
and criticizing the diverse and possibly conflicting findings. Any
reports from these experts would need to be made available to
counsel, since a report's conclusions would remain in varying degrees
tentative and subject to debate. However, such a report would
provide a disinterested evaluation - an important step in attenuating
non-legal information for the Court. The function of Court staff
would be to locate the necessary expertise, based on the Court's
understanding of what forecasts of consequences it must assess in
order to develop appropriate legal principles.
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As the Supreme Court's diagnostic adjudication evolves over
time, the staff functions associated with assessing forecasts of
consequences should take on an additional dimension. The Court
should examine its previous decisions to see what their consequences
(both legal and non-legal) have been, and to see whether forecasts
proved to be accurate.
This type of post-audit of decisions has been done in trial
courts that use diagnostic adjudication. For example, trial judges
who sentence offenders based on individualized pre-sentence reports
make certain assumptions about the consequences of their decisions.
One American trial judge hired a researcher to see what happened
to defendants the judge had sentenced in previous years, so that she
could assess whether her forecasts about the characteristics of
individuals and the viability of particular sentence options were valid.
An analogous post-audit of the consequences of Supreme Court
decisions would be more complex and difficult, but could still be
useful as a form of feedback that would help the Court orient itself
toward its future work.
However the Court responds to the specific proposals put
forward in this section - increased use of intervenors, introduction
of memoranda to counsel prior to oral argument, a research and
analysis role for Court staff - the Court must focus on the effective
use of its time in the context of its diagnostic tasks. One aspect of
the effective use of time, the development and refinement of
information, has been the basis for proposals made here. Other
aspects of the question deserve examination as well. The ability of
the Supreme Court of Canada to handle diagnostic adjudication
expeditiously and effectively is at stake.
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